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Introduction
African countries have been growing fast recently.
In 2007, for example, GDP growth averaged
6.2 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),1 nearly
double the rate in 2002 (World Bank 2009) and
comparable to those in other regions of the world.
Since 1995, some 26 African countries, representing
70 percent of the SSA population and 78 percent of
the GDP, have grown their GDPs by an average of
6.9 percent annually, a rate that is comparable to
the 6.7 percent rate over the same period for the
emerging South Asian giant, India, for instance
(Arbache et al. 2008).
Will the past serve as an appropriate guide for
Africa’s economic future? By the mid-1960s, most
African countries had achieved political indepen-
dence from colonial rule.2 Although economic
performance of the sub-continent has, in general,
considerably lagged behind that of other regions
of the world over the post-independence period,
growth has been rather episodic. African coun-
tries grew fairly strongly until about the late
1970s; then the region’s GDP growth began to
decline substantially, falling short of population
growth by the early 1980s and again in the early
1990s. Since the mid-1990s, however, Africa has
once again grown strongly, with some signs of
growth acceleration at the beginning of the
21st century.
The weak overall growth since the late 1970s until
recently is reflected in the dismal poverty picture in
SSA over the last two and one-half decades.The pro-
portion of the population earning less than 1 US dol-
lar decreased only slightly from 42.3 in 1981 to
41.1 percent in 2004. Over the same period, this mea-
sure of poverty fell substantially for South Asia (SAS),
as a reference region,from 49.6 in 1981 to 30.8 percent
in 2004,so that the relative SSA/SAS poverty rate gap
increased steadily by nearly 50 percentage points.3
Recent growth resurgence has brightened Africa’s
poverty picture over the last decade, however. During
1993–2004,the poverty rates at the USD 1 and USD 2
standards fell by 4.4 and 4.1 percentage points for
SSA, respectively, comparable to the 6.1 and 5.1 per-
centage points for SAS (see Fosu 2009a).4
The current paper, first, briefly discusses the African
growth record. Second, it presents evidence on the
historical sources of growth.Third,the paper employs
the taxonomy of ‘policy syndromes’ to explain the
observed growth patterns.5 Fourth, it discusses how
governance might help decrease the likelihood of
these syndromes and hence increase growth.
The African growth record
GDP of the SSA region grew at an average yearly
rate of approximately 5.0 percent (per capita rate of
about 2.0 percent) for about a decade and a half
from 1960, with significant positive contributions
from a substantial number of countries (Table 1).6
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1 ‘Africa’ and ‘SSA’ are used interchangeably in the paper.
2 Although the majority of SSA countries had not yet achieved
independence by 1960, it is the conventional starting date for the
post-independence period.By 1965,however,most of the countries
had. Those attaining independence after 1965 are: Botswana,
Lesotho, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Swaziland, Guinea Bissau,
Angola,Cape Verde,Comoros,Mozambique,Sao Tome,Seychelles,
Djibouti, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, in chronological
order.
3 However, the differences in performance between SSA and SAS
at the USD 2 poverty standard since 1981 have been much less dra-
matic. The SSA rate decreased slightly from 74 in 1981 to 72 per-
cent in 2004,while the SAS rate declined from 88 in 1981 to 77 per-
cent in 2004, which remains greater than the SSA poverty rate.
Hence, the SSA/SAS difference in the poverty rate increased by
less than 10 percentage points, as compared with nearly 50 per-
centage points in the case of the USD 1 standard (Fosu 2009a).
4 Indeed, the recently revised World Bank data show a slightly
smaller percentage-point reduction in poverty in SAS than in SSA
for the USD 1.25 standard: 7 versus 8 percentage points between
1996 and 2005, while both regions exhibit about the same 4 per-
centage-point decrease at the USD 2.50 standard. Unfortunately,
the lack of poverty data prevents extending the analysis backward
to the 1970s or 1960s.
5 By the policy syndromes it is meant ex-ante anti-growth policies,
classified as: ‘state controls’, ‘adverse redistribution’, ‘suboptimal
inter-temporal resource allocation,’ and ‘state breakdown’. The
absence of any of these syndromes is referred to as a ‘syndrome-
free’ regime. Details of this taxonomy are presented below.
6 These numbers are the GDP-weighted growth rates which are
consistent with the usual World Bank statistics.CESifo Forum 1/2010 63
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This rate could not be sustained in subsequent
years, however, falling below population growth
in the early 1980s and early 1990s. It was not until
the latter 1990s that SSA began to grow suffi-
ciently to overcome population increases. Thus,
the issue of the overall African growth record is
not necessarily a case of consistently dismal per-
formance, but rather one of episodic growth
(Figure 1).
The aggregate evidence masks the considerable
disparities in growth among SSA countries,howev-
Table 1
Annual GDP per capita growth between 1960 and 2006, 5 year averages (%) 
Country  61–65 66–70 71–  5 76–80 81–85 86–90 91–95 96–00 01–05  2006 Average
Angola  0.69  –  6.73 3.84 7.40  15.26 1.96 
Benin  1.44 0.46  –  1.13 1.13 1.17  –  2.38 0.53 2.19 0.59 0.90 0.46 
Botswana  3.64 7.75  14.33 8.12 6.45 8.51 1.27 6.23 4.17 0.93 6.59 
Burkina  Faso  1.40 0.89 0.80 1.28 1.68 0.16 0.96 3.71 2.89 3.24 1.57 
Burundi 0.15 5.70  –  0.29 1.87 1.88 0.60  –  4.20  –  2.63  –  1.10 1.08 0.24 
Cameroon  0.44  –  0.86 3.86 3.73 6.23  –  5.15  –  4.54 2.25 1.30 1.59 0.82 
Cape  Verde  6.40 1.30 2.71 3.95 2.71 3.69 3.43 
Central
African Rep. – 1.21  1.08  0.02  – 1.74  – 0.53  – 2.26  – 1.64  0.09  – 2.49  2.30  – 0.89 
Chad  – 1.51  – 0.71  – 1.50  – 6.52  6.47  – 1.20  – 0.72  – 0.75  11.19  – 2.62  0.46 
Comoros  1.60  – 1.00  – 1.31  – 0.65  0.64  – 1.64  – 0.20 
Congo. Dem.
Rep. 0.11  0.70  – 0.58  – 4.51  – 1.04  – 3.07 
– 
10.35  – 6.01  1.02  1.79  – 2.54 
Congo. Rep. 0.74  1.99  4.76  1.95  7.28  – 3.10  – 2.33  – 0.29  1.86  4.11  1.49 
Cote d'Ivoire 4.06  5.15  1.94  – 0.29  – 4.20  – 2.71  – 1.67  0.58  – 1.72  – 0.91  0.10 
Equatorial
Guinea  – 0.86  4.56  32.23  24.06  – 7.76  13.91 
Eritrea  12.19  – 1.51  – 0.51  – 4.47  2.90 
Ethiopia  –  3.93 1.84  –  0.50 1.81 2.98 6.19 0.66 
Gabon  7.54  4.45  15.27  – 2.23  – 0.35  – 1.34  0.28  – 1.84  – 0.03  – 0.37  2.35 
Gambia 1.55 2.04 1.06  –  0.21 0.19  –  1.62 0.87 0.74 1.61 0.60 
Ghana  0.28 0.92  –  2.57  –  0.93  –  3.56 1.82 1.44 1.87 2.71 4.01 0.30 
Guinea  –  0.19  –  0.50 1.10  –  0.05 1.91 1.18 0.82 0.58 
Guinea–Bissau  0.96 –  4.48  3.95  1.10 –  0.04 –  1.74 –  3.13  1.12 –  0.44 
Kenya  0.22 2.37 6.11 2.45  –  1.28 2.00  –  1.49  –  0.51 0.95 3.34 1.25 
Lesotho  5.68 0.71 3.52 7.66 0.49 4.10 2.49 1.38 1.85 6.42 3.17 
Liberia  0.47  3.65 –  1.32 –  0.88 –  4.78  –16.32 –21.86 29.50 –  5.60  3.67 –  1.78 
Madagascar  –  1.14  2.02 –  1.96 –  1.27 –  4.30 –  0.13 –  3.18  0.79 –  0.26  2.06 –  0.98 
Malawi 2.18 2.34 4.32 1.51  –  0.98  –  2.90 2.14 1.03  –  1.52 4.69 0.99 
Mali 1.29 1.10 2.67  –  4.43 1.38 0.34 2.38 3.27 2.16 1.03 
Mauritania  8.85 2.76  –  1.94 0.15  –  1.71  –  0.08 0.52  –  0.27 1.09 8.74 1.21 
Mauritius 3.29 6.55 3.87 4.21 3.18 2.70 4.16
Mozambique  –  6.38 5.30  –  0.62 4.71 6.01 5.71 1.95 
Namibia  –  2.75  –  1.85 1.73 0.94 3.28 1.55 0.32 
Niger  2.88  – 3.62  – 5.17  2.10  – 5.18  – 0.50  – 2.59  – 0.73  0.62  1.20  – 1.30 
Nigeria  2.12 3.05 3.10 0.98  –  5.41 2.38  –  0.40 0.33 3.10 2.75 1.07 
Rwanda  – 3.67  4.10  – 2.24  6.73  – 0.68  – 1.96  0.75  2.00  2.85  2.74  0.92 
Senegal – 0.87  – 1.09  – 0.56  – 1.54  – 0.04  – 0.64  – 0.67  1.40  1.99  – 0.26  – 0.23 
Seychelles  1.04 1.33 4.88 6.88 0.01 4.77 1.41 4.71  –  2.16 3.18 2.56 
Sierra Leone  2.60  2.27  0.58  0.36  – 1.16  – 1.53  – 5.30  – 5.23  9.19  4.45  0.29 
Somalia – 3.38  1.38  1.55  – 5.17  2.57  0.49  – 0.41 
South  Africa  4.05 2.91 1.35 0.89  –  1.14  –  0.68  –  1.22 0.41 2.58 3.88 1.08 
Sudan  – 0.36  – 1.02  1.96  – 0.49  – 2.36  2.12  2.46  3.88  4.35  9.41  1.35 
Swaziland  6.54  – 0.07  – 0.50  6.88  – 0.28  0.27  0.77  1.46  1.93 
Tanzania 2.13  –  1.39 1.53 3.84 3.31 1.61 
Togo  8.16  2.10  1.00  2.38 –  3.89 –  0.84 –  2.01  0.84 –  0.72  1.31  0.79 
Uganda  –  2.48 1.24 3.38 3.39 2.33 2.08 1.59 
Zambia 3.06 –  1.55 –  0.93 –  2.79 –  2.65 –  1.39 –  3.84  0.38  2.83  4.22 –  0.66 
Zimbabwe 0.22  5.86  1.40  – 1.62  0.37  1.11  – 0.95  – 0.55  – 6.00  – 0.02 
SSA simple
average  1.64 1.87 1.80 0.55  –  0.39 0.13  –  0.86 2.29 2.10 2.54 1.05 
World Bank 
SSA weighted
average  2.63 2.02 1.52 0.07  –  1.76  –  0.34  –  1.45 0.70 1.97 3.04 0.65 
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er. During the period from 1981 to 1985, for exam-
ple, when per capita growth was appreciably nega-
tive in SSA as a whole, many African countries
actually registered growth rates of at least 1 per-
centage point above population growth.7 Another
salient observation is the heterogeneity in growth
patterns across countries. Many economies that
started as growth leaders in the 1960s had become
growth laggards by 2000 (e.g. Cote d’Ivoire,
Gabon, Kenya, South Africa, Togo, and Zambia –
see also Table 1). Conversely, several laggards in
the earlier period became growth leaders as of the
1990s (e.g. Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal
and Sudan). In contrast, one African country that
has exhibited consistently high economic growth is
Botswana. Its GDP growth averaged about 10 per-
cent annually over the entire period, and at least
5 percent every decadal period,
though the record since the
1990s has been less than spec-
tacular.
Furthermore, African countries
have exhibited highly variable
growth rates over the last four
decades. The standard deviation
of the per-worker GDP growth
for a sample of nineteen SSA
countries with consistent data
averaged 3.2 percent over
1960–2000, which was the high-
est among all regions of the
world (Table 2).8 Indeed, SSA’s
coefficient of variation (CV) is
nearly four times the world average, so that the
region exhibited a lower mean growth with higher
variance as compared to the rest of the world.
Sources of growth in Africa
Table 3 reports data on the sources of GDP
growth for SSA over 1960–2000. These statistics
show that, when SSA grew fairly strongly in the
1960s through the mid-1970s, growth was support-
ed about equally by both investment and growth
of total factor productivity (TFP). When econom-
ic growth fell substantially in the early 1980s and
again in the early 1990s, however, it was mainly
due to the deterioration in TFP. Moreover, the pri-
mary source of the growth recovery in the late
1990s was TFP improvement.
The overall per-worker growth
in SSA during the forty-year
period was positive but mod-
est. Furthermore, both physical
capital and human capital
(education) contributed fav-
ourably to this growth. In con-
trast, TFP’s contribution was
negative, though small. More
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Source: World Bank (2008).
HALF-DECADAL MEAN ANNUAL SSA GDP GROWTH RATES
  1961–2005
 %
Note: Growth rates are based on 46 SSA countries and are GDP-weighted so that South Africa's value 
would substantially affect the overall SSA average.
SSA
SSA excl. South Africa
Figure 1
Table 2
Annual growth of real GDP per worker –
SSA versus other regions:
mean and variability measures 1960–2000 (%) 




























Notes: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa (19), LAC = Latin America and
Caribbean (22), SAS = South Asia (4), EAP = East Asia and Pacific (8),
MENA = Middle-East & North Africa (11), IC = Industrial Countries (20);
figures in parentheses are the numbers of countries for the respective
regions. Selected countries are those with consistent data over 1960-2000
and seem sufficiently representative of the respective regions. The 19 SSA
countries are: Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Source: Ndulu and O’Connell (2003).
7 This point is further discussed below.
8 See the notes of Table 2 for details.The
19 countries represent all sub-regions of
SSA and constitute 72 percent of the
SSA population, as well as the lion’s
share of the region’s GDP. Nonetheless,
they still represent less than one-half of
the number of SSA countries, and this
caveat should be noted in interpreting
the present results.CESifo Forum 1/2010 65
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in the overall performance of African countries, in
terms of growth as well as its sources, a subject to
which I now turn.
1960 to mid-1970s
This early period is characterised by relatively high
growth, explained primarily by physical capital
accumulation and TFP growth, at approximately
45 percent shares each (see Table 3). Growth per-
formance was, however, uneven across countries
(see Table 1). Although other country-specific fac-
tors explain the differences, it is observable that
nearly all the high-growth countries during this
sub-period had relatively liberal economic regimes
nurtured by conservative political governments,
while the reverse was the case for most of the low-
performing countries. For example, Botswana,
Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, and
Malawi were countries with both high growth and
market-oriented policies, supported by politically
conservative governments during this period. In
contrast, weak-growth performers such as Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Guinea,
Senegal, and Zambia had market-interventionist
policies.9 Beyond the control nature of the regime,
the relatively weak growth in several countries,
despite the overall good SSA record, could also 
be attributed to external factors, political instabili-
ty, and weak institutions: e.g. Burundi, Mauritius,
Rwanda, and Sudan.
Mid-1970s to early 1990s
The 1980s may be character-
ized as ‘Africa’s lost decade’;
per-capita income of Africans
at the end of the 1980s had fall-
en below the level prevailing at
the beginning of the decade.
The source of the contraction is
primarily the deterioration in
TFP (Table 3), likely attribut-
able mainly to idle capacity,
which became a major impedi-
ment to the industrialization
process of African economies
(Mytelka 1989). The supply
shocks of the 1970s and early
1980s, both negative and posi-
tive, are observed to have
engendered policy syndromes
that resulted in weak growth
performance (Fosu, 2008a).
Negative terms of trade provide only a partial expla-
nation for the dismal performance. For example,
among the countries registering negative growths in
GDP, while Ghana, Mozambique, Niger, Namibia
and Nigeria experienced substantial losses in terms
of trade in the early 1980s, Togo, Mali and Mada-
gascar did not.What appears to be a relatively com-
mon feature is that most of these poor-performing
economies were saddled with control regimes inher-
ent in the socialistic strategy of development: e.g.
Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique,
Niger, Nigeria and Togo.
Although SSA countries generally experienced
poor economic growth during this sub-period,there
were notable exceptions. For instance, many coun-
tries bucked the trend in the early 1980s (at least
1.0 percent per-capita growth): Benin, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde,
Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Guinea Bissau,
Table 3
Growth decomposition for Sub-Saharan Africa 1960–2000 (%) 
Contribution of growth in























































* A measure of growth of total factor productivity (TFP).
Notes: This is the Collins-Bosworth decomposition and is based on the
production function: q=Ak
.35h
.65, where q, k and h are GDP per worker,
physical capital per worker and human capital (average years of schooling)
per worker, respectively, with respective capital and labor shares of 0.35
and 0.65. The exercise is conducted on per-country basis for the 19 count-
ries with consistent data for 1960-2000 (see also note for Table 2), and then
aggregated.
Source: Ndulu and O’Connell (2003).
9 For regime classification, see Collier and O’Connell (2008).
Politically conservative governments tended to have liberal mar-
ket-oriented economic policies, while the socialist-leaning ones
would generally resort to (soft or hard) controls on economic activ-
ities.As ‘policy syndromes’, control regimes are expected to inhib-
it growth. However, as the classifications were conducted indepen-
dently of growth outcomes, as they should be, several cases do not
conform to these expectations. For instance, Gabon and the
Republic of Congo were classified as control regimes but exhibited
relatively high growth during this period, while countries like
Madagascar, Mauritania and Rwanda were viewed as syndrome-
free regimes for most of the sub-period but experienced low
growth. Similarly, Malawi was classified as syndrome-free through-
out despite its growth record being checkered. Obviously, factors
other than regime classification contributed to growth perfor-
mance as well.CESifo Forum 1/2010 66
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Mauritius, and Somalia (see also Table 1). Further-
more, in most of these countries, it was a continua-
tion of the fairly strong growth in the 1970s. While
the explanation of such relatively high growth is
likely to differ across countries, one common fea-
ture was that nearly all these countries experienced
considerable appreciations in their terms of trade
during this period.
In spite of the slight growth recovery for SSA gen-
erally in the latter part of the 1980s, the early 1990s
were simply calamitous, with similar abysmal
growth as in the early 1980s. Much of this under-
performance could be attributed to severe political
instabilities, as in Angola, Burundi, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra
Leone, as well as to negative terms of trade
shocks.10 Despite the overall dismal growth perfor-
mance of SSA in the early 1990s, however, there
were a number of exceptions. The following coun-
tries registered decent growth (at least 1.0 percent
per capita GDP growth): Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ghana,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles,
Sudan, and Uganda (Table 1). What is interesting
about this list of countries is that only a small num-
ber of them experienced appreciable terms-of-
trade (TOT) improvements during the late 1980s or
early 1990s.Instead,most these countries were ‘syn-
drome-free’ and many had adopted structural
adjustment programs (SAPs),such as Burkina Faso,
Ghana, Namibia and Uganda, suggesting that for
such countries reforms may have aided growth.
Since mid-1990s
African economies have generally recovered since
the mid-1990s (see also Table 1). Annual GDP
growth has averaged approximately 4.0 percent
(3.6 percent when South Africa is included and
4.1 percent when it is excluded: see Figure 1).
Indeed, growth has accelerated to 4.5 percent for
non-South-African SSA economies since the begin-
ning of the millennium, while South Africa’s GDP
growth has averaged slightly less at 4.1 percent.This
growth can be accounted for by TFP improvements
(Table 3).11 Bucking the trend during this period are
mostly countries experiencing severe political insta-
bility, such as Burundi, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Seychelles,
Togo and Zimbabwe.
One plausible explanation for the growth resurgence
is the TOT improvements.12 However, despite their
general unpopularity,13 the SAPs appear to have
been beneficial to growth in several cases. Countries
like Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Rwanda and Sudan under-
took credible SAPs, leading to improvements of
their respective macroeconomic environments for
growth. Coupled with better macroeconomic envi-
ronments,TOT improvements have apparently been
translated to sustained economic growth. Actually,
many countries have grown well since the mid-1990s
despite weak TOT performance (negative or near-
zero growth during 1996–2005): e.g. Benin,
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritius,
and Uganda.With the exception of Botswana, which
apparently did not need SAP, all these countries had
undertaken credible reforms, or were considered
syndrome-free during the period.14
Policy syndromes and the African economic growth
record
Numerous explanations have been offered for the
African growth record. Receiving much attention
have been initial conditions, including: colonial ori-
gins (Acemoglu et al. 2001), ethnicity (Easterly and
Levine 1997), geography (Bloom and Sachs 1998),
natural resources (Sachs and Warner 2001), and the
slave trade (Nunn 2008). A recent comprehensive
10 Indeed, for 1989-1993, SSA net barter terms of trade declined at
an average of 2.5 percent per year.
11 Note that Table 3 provides no evidence for the more recent post-
2000 period.
12 TOT grew strongly for SSA overall in 1994 and 1995 at rates of
2.9 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively, and averaged 0.6 percent
and 1.5 percent annually in 1996–2000 and 2001–05, respectively,
for a yearly mean of 1.0 percent since 1996 (computed by author
using data from World Bank 2007).
13 Many studies have, indeed, argued that SAPs have been detri-
mental to African development, including de-industrialization and
diminution of the social sector (e.g. Cogan 2002; Lall 1995;
Mkandawire and Soludo 1999; Mytelka 1989; Sender 1999). While
such arguments have some merit, they tend to ignore the fact that
the deindustrialization process had already begun in many African
countries before SAPs, due primarily to industrial operation ineffi-
ciencies and adverse terms of trade shocks. Regarding the social
sector, Fosu (2007 and 2008c) find that on average public spending
on health and education in SSA actually trended upward in the lat-
ter 1980s and early 1990s, despite SAPs, an observation that cor-
roborates an earlier finding by Sahn (1992).
14 A considerable portion of the TFP improvements, leading to
stronger growth performance, is likely attributable to reductions in
idle capacity following the reforms. Gross domestic capital forma-
tion as share of GDP in SSA has also risen, from 16.8 percent in
2000 to 19.5 percent in 2006 (World Bank 2007). As early reform-
ers among SSA economies, Ghana and Uganda stand out as possi-
bly shining examples of how reforms may have worked. However,
there were also countries, such as Malawi, which undertook credi-
ble SAPs but did not fare as well perhaps due to substantial TOT
deterioration (– 2.3 percent annual average in 1996-2005 for
Malawi). But, even Malawi’s per capita GDP growth rebounded
strongly to nearly 5.0 percent in 2006 following a mean annual
decline of 1.5 percent during 1996–2005 (see Table 1).CESifo Forum 1/2010 67
Special
study, the ‘Growth Project’ of the African Economic
Research Consortium (AERC), combines both
cross-sectional analysis and at least 26 country cases
to explain the African growth record since 1960.15
The main thesis is that policies matter for growth in
Africa, despite the initial conditions. The project
characterizes the following policy syndromes as
detrimental to growth: (a) state controls, (b) adverse
redistribution, (c) suboptimal inter-temporal re-
source allocation and (d) state breakdown, while
their absence is referred to as syndrome-free.16
Discussed below briefly are these policy syndromes
(see Collier and O’Connell 2008; Fosu 2008a; Fosu
and O’Connell 2006), with their frequency data pre-
sented in Table 4.
State controls
A country was judged as having state controls, if the
government “heavily distorted major economic mar-
kets (labor, finance, domestic and international
trade, and production) in service of state-led and
inward-looking development strategies” (Fosu and
O’Connell 2006, 38). The relative frequency of state
controls exceeded 30 percent in the early 1960s,
reached a half-decadal peak in excess of 40 percent
during the early 1980s,but decreased thereafter,rep-
resenting only about 15 percent by the late 1990s,
perhaps in response to the SAPs.
Adverse redistribution
Adverse redistribution occurs when redistributive
policies are determined as favouring the constituen-
cies of respective government leaders, usually re-
gional in nature and with ethnic undertones, likely
resulting in polarization.17 Also classified under this
syndrome is the case of downright looting, such as
the regimes of Mobutu in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (1973–97), Idi Amin in Uganda
(1971–79) and Sani Abacha in Nigeria (1993–98)
(Collier and O’Connell 2008). The relative frequen-
cy of this syndrome increased steadily right from the
immediate post-independence period,until the early
1990s when it began to reverse course.
Suboptimal inter-temporal resource allocation 
Suboptimal inter-temporal resource allocation rep-
resents revenue misallocation over time: overspend-
ing during commodity booms and expenditure
under-spending during the subsequent busts.The in-
cidence of this syndrome was relatively small,
though, representing only about 10 percent of the
country-years during 1960–2000. It was quite mini-
mal in the immediate post-independence period, but
then began increasing in the early 1970s, achieving a
relatively high plateau beginning in the mid-1970s
15 The project output appears in two volumes: Ndulu et al (2008a
and 2008b).An epitomized version of the study is provided in Fosu
and O’Connell (2006).
16 Much of the present section derives from Fosu (2008a), which
presents a number of case studies to illustrate each syndrome and
syndrome-free. The definitions of the regimes, provided below,
form the basis for the classification of each country-year into one
or more of the categories by the editorial committee of the Growth
Project. Note that “classification is based on policies, not growth
outcomes” (Fosu and O’Connell 2006, 37). For example, though
Sudan grew rather rapidly in the late 1990s it was not categorized
during this period as syndrome-free but instead as state break-
down. Conversely, Malawi was designated syndrome-free through-
out the post-independence period,yet it stagnated in the 1980s,and
so did Cote d’Ivoire in the early 1980s despite its syndrome-free
classification during that period.
Table 4






















































































Notes: These figures are for 47 countries. All syndrome/syndrome-free classifications are defined in the text. The fre-
quencies in the first five columns have been adjusted here to sum to 1.0 for each period, as multiple syndromes for a
given country-year could occur. The frequencies of the last two columns have also been adjusted here to sum to 1.0.
Sources: Fosu and O’Connell (2006); Collier and O’Connell (2008) for raw data. 
17 It is important to stress, though, that redistribution need not be
adverse, that is, if it promotes harmony. As Azam (1995) for
instance argues,governments could use redistribution to buy peace,
especially between the north and south in many West African coun-
tries (e.g. Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria).CESifo Forum 1/2010 68
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amidst commodity booms in
many African countries, and




mainly to open warfare, such as
civil wars, but also to acute elite
political instability involving
coups d’état that result in a
breakdown of law and order.18
It constituted about 10 percent
of the country-years during
1960–2000. Despite widespread
belief, open warfare has histori-
cally been rather rare in Africa, that is, until more
recently in the 1990s when its relative frequency
doubled to 20 percent of the country-years, from
about 5 percent in the 1970s.Despite this syndrome’s
historically low frequency,however,its impact can be
quite large.19
The syndrome-free regime
Syndrome-free (SF) results if none of the above syn-
dromes is present, that is, when there is political sta-
bility with reasonably market-friendly policies (Fosu
and O’Connell 2006). Interestingly, at more than
one-quarter of the country-years, the frequency of
SF was rather large in 1960–2000, and higher than
that of any syndrome except the regulatory. Indeed,
in the immediate 1960–65 post-independence peri-
od, the relative frequency of SF was about 50 per-
cent. Its prevalence, however, began to wane during
the latter-1960s;the downward trend continued until
roughly the mid-1980s when it reversed course. The
upward trend actually accelerated in the 1990s, most
likely as a result of the SAPs. Fosu and O’Connell
(2006) find for 1960–2000 that SF was a necessary
condition for sustaining growth and a near-sufficient
condition for preventing a growth collapse.
Attributable to SF is 2 or higher percentage-point
increase in per capita annual growth (see also Collier
and O’Connell 2008; Fosu 2009b). Such an estimate
represents about twice Africa’s growth gap with the
rest of the world during 1960–2000, a third of its gap
with East Asia and Pacific, and more than the gap
with South Asia (see Table 2).
The role of governance
Based on five-year panel country data over
1960–2000,Fosu (2009b) finds that governance,mea-
sured by the degree of constraint on the executive
branch of government (XCONST) tends to increase
growth in African economies; however, too much
constraint could also hurt growth.More importantly,
XCONST is positively correlated with SF. Indeed, it
is better correlated with SF than with growth per se.
As Figure 2 shows for the aggregate level, XCONST
and SF track rather well inter-temporally.
In a follow-up study,Fosu (2009c) finds that the dele-
terious effect of ethnic fractionalization on growth
could be attenuated by XCONST. Consistent with
Collier (2000), then, ‘good governance’ may help
reduce the incidence of policy syndromes. Further-
more, Alence (2004) observes that democratic insti-
tutions in Africa greatly improve ‘developmental
governance’, which he defines as ‘economic policy
coherence (free-market policies), public-service
effectiveness,and limited corruption’.He additional-
ly finds that while ‘restricted political contestation’
(with limited executive constraints) has little direct
impact on developmental governance, executive
restraints improve developmental governance even
if there is little political contestation. These results














EVOLUTIONS OF SYNDROME-FREE AND EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS
  1961–2004
 %
Notes: See Table 4 for syndrome-free data; degree of constraint on the executive = XCONST.
Syndrome-free Excutive constraints
Figure 2
18 Most of the classifications into state breakdowns involved civil
wars, which are growth-inhibiting (Collier 1999; Gyimah-
Brempong and Corley 2005). However, many studies have also
uncovered adverse effects of the incidence of coups d’etat on
growth – see Fosu (2002 and 1992); Gyimah-Brempong and
Traynor (1999), which may not necessarily be classified under this
syndrome.
19 The impact of state breakdown on Africa’s per capita annual
GDP growth is estimated to be as much as 2.6 percentage points
(Fosu and O’Connell 2006), the largest among all the syndromes,
and slightly larger than the 2.2 percentage points obtained for civil
wars by Collier (1999).CESifo Forum 1/2010 69
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But how is the optimal XCONST level achieved for
development governance purposes? One way is via a
disciplined executive that constrains itself, as per-
haps in the case of China; however, this strategy
seems not to have worked well in Africa.Another is
via a democratic process. Unfortunately, an en-
trenched executive may block attempts to restrict its
power. One way to reduce this likelihood is to
impose office-term limitations on the executive, as
many African countries currently have. Further-
more, Fosu (2008b) finds that electoral competitive-
ness can enhance growth in African countries, but
only in ‘advanced-level’ democracies. Apparently,
certain countries are susceptible to political disorder
that may occur at the early stages of democratization
(negative ‘intermediate-level’ effects). An appropri-
ate solution would entail identifying such countries
ex ante and finding means of forestalling these
potential adverse effects.
As indicated above, state breakdown has been the
most potent detractor of growth among the various
policy syndromes. Unfortunately, many African
countries degenerated into political disorder and
open conflicts in the 1990s, resulting in part from
the political reforms that ensued in support of eco-
nomic reforms.As previously authoritarian govern-
ments began to lose their grip on authority,a power
vacuum was created, which tended to undermine
the cohesion of the state.In other cases,distributive
politics replaced authoritarian rule that had previ-
ously succeeded in preserving the nation-state,
opening up wounds of divisionism and accentuating
polarization with ethnic undertones. By the 1990s,
countries like Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Re-
public of Congo, Djibouti, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Sudan and Togo had all descended
into severe political instability, most in the form of
open conflicts.
While political reforms may be blamed for many of
these adverse political outcomes, it is also true that
the new international political order that saw the
diminution of the Cold War increased the tenden-
cy for insurrection, for the likelihood of their suc-
cess increased. Thus, as SF has increased in the
1990s, so has the incidence of state breakdown
(Figure 3), implying the need for increased atten-
tion toward post-conflict economies (Fosu and
Collier 2005).
Conclusions and policy implications
The present paper has argued that learning from the
past will appropriately inform Africa’s economic
future. First, presenting the growth record of
African economies,the paper highlights that despite
the usual observation that the overall post-indepen-
dence growth has been paltry, the record has been
less than uniform. From 1960 until the mid-1970s,
African countries generally grew reasonably well,
with GDP growth rates of nearly 2 percentage
points annually above population growth, though
this performance was still below that of other
regions. Growth declined substantially in the 1980s
and early 1990s, however, resulting in decreases in
per capita income. Growth has resurged in many
African economies since the mid-1990s, however,
with per capita annual GDP increasing on average
by about 2 percent once again. Indeed, there has
been further acceleration in growth more recently
in the 21st century. The aggre-
gate picture fails to properly
reflect the heterogeneity in
African country performance,
though. For example, Botswana
and Mauritius have performed
spectacularly well during the
overall period. Moreover, even
when growth declined substan-
tially in the early 1980s and
early 1990s, many African coun-
tries bucked the trend. Country-
level growth has also been
episodic, with many of those
starting out with relatively
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Second, the paper has presented evidence on the
decomposition of economic growth. It finds that
changes in total factor productivity (TFP) were
strongly associated with economic growth perfor-
mance in Africa generally. When growth was rela-
tively strong in the 1960s and 1970s,TFP was a major
contributing factor, which also explained the sub-
stantial deterioration in growth in the early 1980s
and early 1990s. Similarly, the recent resurgence in
growth has been associated with major TFP im-
provements.
Third, the ‘policy syndrome’ taxonomy explains the
growth record reasonably well. The absence of syn-
dromes, namely, a syndrome-free regime (SF), could
raise annual per capita GDP growth by more than
2 percentage points, a rather large amount, given
that SSA’s growth has averaged less than 1.0 percent
over the post-independence period. Much of this
positive effect of SF is attributed to its favourable
influence on TFP.
Fourth,‘good governance’, represented by appropri-
ate constraints on the government executive
(XCONST), appears promising for augmenting SF
and,hence,for increasing growth.Unfortunately,the
recent rise in SF is also accompanied by an increase
in the incidence of state breakdown. With the addi-
tional evidence suggesting that electoral competi-
tiveness can enhance growth in relatively advanced-
level democracies in Africa, it appears that the real
challenge is to explore the path toward meaningful
democratization that is capable of both augmenting
SF and attenuating state breakdown. Meanwhile, as
several African countries have already experienced
conflicts, it is imperative that we accord special
attention to post-conflict economies.
References
Acemoglu,D.,S.Johnson and J.Robinson (2001),“Colonial Origins
of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”,
American Economic Review 91, 1369–1401.
Alence, R. (2004), “Political Institutions and Developmental
Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of Modern African
Studies 42, 163–187.
Arbache, J., D. Go and J. Page (2008), Is Africa’s Economy at a
Turning Point?, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4519.
Azam,J.P.(1995),“How to Pay for the Peace? A Theoretical Frame-
work with Reference to African Countries”, Public Choice 83,
173–184.
Bloom, D. and J. Sachs (1998), “Geography, Demography and
Economic Growth in Africa”, Brookings Papers in Economic
Activity 29, 20–273.
Bosworth, B. P. and S. M. Collins (2003),“The Empirics of Growth:
An Update”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 34, 113–179.
Cogan,A. L. (2002), Hazardous to Health: the World Bank and IMF
in Africa, Africa Action Position Paper,April,
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic-041802.html.
Collier, P. (1999).“On the Economics of the Consequences of Civil
War”, Oxford Economic Papers 51, 168–183.
Collier, P. (2000), “Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance”,
Economics and Politics 12, 229–272.
Collier,P.and S.O’Connell (2008),“Opportunities and Choices”,in:
Ndulu,B.,S.O’Connell,R.Bates,P.Collier and C.Soludo (eds.),The
Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa 1960–2000,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 76–136.
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (1997), “Africa’s Growth Tragedy:
Policies and Ethnic Divisions”,Quarterly Journal of Economics 112,
1203–1250.
Fosu, A. K. (1992), “Political Instability and Economic Growth:
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa”, Economic Development and
Cultural Change 40, 829–841.
Fosu, A. K. (2002), “Political Instability and Economic Growth:
Implications of Coup Events in Sub-Saharan Africa”, American
Journal of Economics and Sociology 61, 329–348.
Fosu,A. K. (2007),“Fiscal Allocation for Education in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Implications of the External Debt Service Constraint”,
World Development 35, 702–713.
Fosu,A.K.(2008a),“Anti-Growth Syndromes in Africa:A Synthesis
of the Case Studies”, in: Ndulu, B., S. O’Connell, R. Bates, P. Collier
and C.Soludo (eds.),The Political Economy of Economic Growth in
Africa 1960–2000, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
137–172.
Fosu, A. K. (2008b), “Democracy and Growth in Africa: Im-
plications of Increasing Electoral Competitiveness”, Economics
Letters 100, 442–444.
Fosu, A. K. (2008c). “Implications of External Debt-Servicing
Constraint for Public Health Expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa”,
Oxford Development Studies 36, 363–377.
Fosu, A. K. (2009a), “Inequality and the Impact of Growth on
Poverty:Comparative Evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa”,Journal of
Development Studies 45, 726–745.
Fosu,A. K. (2009b), Understanding the African Growth Record:The
Importance of Policy Syndromes and Governance, UNU-WIDER
Discussion Paper 2009/02.
Fosu, A. K. (2009c), Impacts of Policy Syndromes and Governance
on Productivity and Growth of African Economies, Paper Presented
at the CSAE Conference, Oxford University (March 2009).
Fosu, A. K. and P. Collier (eds. 2005), Post-Conflict Economies in
Africa, International Economic Association Conference Volume
140, New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.
Fosu,A.K.and S.O’Connell (2006),“Explaining African Economic
Growth:The Role of Anti-growth Syndromes”, in: Bourguignon, F.
and B. Pleskovic (eds.), Annual Bank Conference on Development
Economics (ABCDE), Washington DC:World Bank, 31–66.
Gyimah-Brempong, K. and M. E. Corley (2005), “Civil Wars and
Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African
Economies 14, 270–311.
Gyimah-Brempong, K. and T. Traynor (1999), “Political Instability,
Investment and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal
of African Economies 8, 52–86.
Lall, S. (1995), “Structural Adjustment and African Industries”,
World Development 23, 2019–2031.
Mkandawire, T. and C. Soludo (1999), Our Continent Our Future:
African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment, Dakar:CODESRIA,
Trenton, NJ:Africa World Press.
Mytelka, L. (1989), “The Unfulfilled Promise of African Indus-
trialization”, African Studies Review 32, 77–137.
Ndulu, B. and S. O’Connell (2003), Revised Collins/Bosworth




Ndulu, B., S. O’Connell, R. Bates, P. Collier and C. Soludo (eds.
2008), The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa
1960–2000, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CESifo Forum 1/2010 71
Special
Ndulu, B., S. O’Connell, J. P. Azam, R. H. Bates, A. K. Fosu, J. W.
Gunning and D. Njinkeu (eds. 2008), The Political Economy of
Economic Growth in Africa 1960–2000, Vol. 2, Country Case
Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nunn, N. (2008),“The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 139–176.
Sachs, J. and A. Warner (2001), “The Curse of Natural Resources”,
European Economic Review 45, 827–838.
Sahn,D.E.(1992),“Public Expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa dur-
ing a Period of Economic Reform”, World Development 20,
673–693.
Sender, J. (1999), “Africa’s Economic Performance: Limitations of
the Current Consensus”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 13,
89–114.
World Bank (2004), World Development Indicators CDROM.
World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators Online 2007.
World Bank (2008), World Development Indicators Online 2008.
World Bank (2009), World Development Indicators Online 2009.